John Wirenius ([info]jwirenius) wrote,
@ 2008-09-25 22:02:00
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Root Causes
Some of those on the political Right are casting about for "market friendly" explanations of our Current Kerfuffle, because, of course, we know that the Giant Invisible Hand can never be wrong. The first such explanation, courtesy of Alanesq, is proferred by economics prof Stan Liebowitz, is that government regulation is the culprit--regulation of the late 1980s, culminating in a 1993 decision by the Boston Fed that banks must "Adopt "relaxed lending standards" or risk being labeled as racists, and face serious penalties under the federal Community Reinvestment Act. "

That's a bit oversimplified. First, Liebowitz himself conflates in the linked article disclosure requirements with substantive regulation:
The shift began in 1989, when Congress amended the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act to force banks to collect racial data on mortgage applicants. By 1991, critics were using that data to paint lenders as racist by showing that minority applicants were approved at far lower rates. Banks were "Shamed By Publicity," as one 1993 New York Times headline put it. </p>

In fact, they found a racial disparity only by ignoring relevant data on applicants' ability to make mortgage payments - such as their assets and credit history.

But the political pressure was intense - with few in politics or media eager to speak the truth. And then, in 1992, came a study from four researchers at the Boston Fed, which seemed to bear out the critics' contentions.

That study was, in fact, based on quite flawed data - but the authors' political, media and academic protectors stifled most serious criticism, smearing the reputation of one whistleblower and allowing the Boston authors to avoid answering serious academic challenges (mine included) to their work. Other studies with different conclusions were ignored.

The very next year, the Boston Fed announced new requirements for banks - rules that have now turned out to be monumentally catastrophic: Adopt "relaxed lending standards" or risk being labeled as racists, and face serious penalties under the federal Community Reinvestment Act.

First, while certain data flaws in the Boston Fed study have been found, the overall results--that minority applicants were declined where similarly situated, including objective measurements of creditworthiness, white applicants were granted loans, have been largely vindicated. (Anecdotally, I could give you some horror stories about this, too--I had some personal involvement with some redlining and discrimination in lending/housing cases, and some of what I saw, even post-2000, was startling).

So Professor Liebowitz's notion that "those pesky libruls" bollixed up a good situation by requiring statistics to be kept regarding discrimination in lending, which did not exist, well--no sale. Does the regulation require acceptance of poor credit risks, simply because of ethnicity? Well, no. Nor, even in the Clinton years, did the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") so loathed by Liebowitz, require any institution to take on credit risks as measured by objective standards; in fact an April 2000 Treasury Department Report om the CRA states unequivocally at pp. 18-19 that lending by CRA-covered institutions to lower and middle income borrowers ("LMI" loans) was finding a new competitor in the years since the amendment of the CRA: the "subprime lending" institutions, to which CRA covered entities were losing market share in the study period. In other words, subprime lending grew alongside, not as a result of, the CRA. (As Jed Bartlet might say, Professor Liebowitz falls into the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc).

What about law professor Richard Epstein's broadside against regulation, also referenced by Alan? Sadly, the piece is pure argument by assertion--from pure Libertarian principles. As a matter of logic, it's not wrong, per se--it just presumes a pure system of the market shaking out, and Pareto optimum being found--a society filled with rational, profit-maximizing individuals, free from emotions. Vulcans, in short. Who may in fact profit from Professor Epstein's scholastic logic, every bit as admirable as deducing the numbers of angels at a cotillion on the head of a pin, but remote to concerns here on earth. See how well it all works out:



So what is the root cause of of the Current Kerfuffle?

Well, I'm no economist, but, at the risk of looking foolish, I'll hazard a sketch, subject to correction. Here's my entirely amateur view:

1. A culture of debt, at all levels. Government as well as corporate, individual and family. We were all spending well beyond our means, and mortgaging the future for our present desires. This includes the US floating the Iraq War on debt, leaving its cost out of the budget and therefore not counting its expenses in the "deficit." Banks fostered it; consumers, for a wide variety of reasons, bought into it. I hate to agree with David Brooks, but I do. Eventually, the bill comes due. Just my luck, it happened on my watch.

2. Seven years of income stagnation for the middle class, during a period (2000-2007) which was, by other measures, considered an expansion--even a boom. (More details resulting in a slight downtick in real median family income numbers. As the Times notes, "[t]his has never happened before, at least not for as long as the government has been keeping records. In every other expansion since World War II, the buying power of most American families grew while the economy did. You can think of this as the most basic test of an economy’s health: does it produce ever-rising living standards for its citizens?" Not in the Bush years, it didn't. Moreover, as income stagnated, the risks posed by illness and the skyrocketing cost of maintaining insurance. Increasing demands on American workers without increasing participation or security may sound good to the corporate class--get more for less--but a successful parasite does not kill its host.

3. Securitization of mortgages, with the result that loan documents were lost, in many cases there is nobody to call or write to seek loss mitigation. The note holders often just don't think retail--and so a salvageable loan drifts to foreclosure, and maximization not of profit, but of loss, for all concerned.

4. Greed and risky investment. Here's where Fannie and Freddie and Bear and Lehman and AIG all had it coming.

Any other thoughts?



(Post a new comment)


[info]dbroussa
2008-09-26 02:58 pm UTC (link)
I agree with you on reason #1. We have in large part convinced ourselves that debt is good (or at least not bad) and thus we instill in our culture at a very early age (well early adult age) the idea that taking out huge loans is just "how things are done". This is one reason why I am in favor of the complete elimination of student loans. In my opinion (which with $3.75 will get a venti latte at Starbucks) student loans have been a huge contributing factor to the decline in secondary education in the US. Not to mention the economic drag of saddling the majority of the new work force with an average of $12,000-20,000 in debt before they ever earn a cent. It has lead to insane tuition inflation that has little to do with the cost of providing that education and more to do with the perception that a college diploma is required and since you can borrow the funds anyway charge what the market can bear (which is artificially inflated due to the flood of "free money" from student loans).

I don't really agree with you on #2, but at the same time I don't disagree with you. My contention is that when I look at the time frame from 2000-2008 I see a slight rise in income in my profession. However, that slight rise is tempered by the fact that the 2001-03 time frame saw steep declines in my professions income levels (due to the dot com bubble bursting). Personally, and for median salaries, IT professionals are making more now in 08 then they were in 00-01, even after inflation adjustments. However, in that time frame they usually suffered a severe salary decrease that imapcted their overall wealth.

Now, if you extend that graph back another 10 years to 1990 and measure middle income growth it is much larger. However, a fair amount of that growth was due to the bubble of the late 90s. When I look at IT salaries (obviously that is my profession and so I watch it much more closely) the great rise in salaries came in the late 90s when we started to see 10-30% annual increases as the norm. Personally I doubled my salary in 3 years from 95-98 and then doubled it again from 98-01. Then I saw it decrease by about 25% and it took me 7 years to surpass my 01 salary. Annecdotal yes, but the pattern was repeated by a number of co-workers. In the end, one can always find a nice statistical break point to graph from that allows one to prove a desied point. That is the nature of statistics. Even so, I don't disagree that middle incomes have not grown as well as other areas. Though, I also point out that usually middle incomes undereport the burgeoning entreprenurial sector that are often classed as businesses in the wage reporting by the gov't.

AS for #3, you are correect. With the US gov't underwriting more and more mortgages it leads to exposure of risk to the US taxpayer. Much like underwriting tuition via student loans leads to tuition inflation the mortgage insuring has lead to speculation that increased prices while low interest rates and guarnateed mortages continued to inflate the bubble.

In the end #4 is also correct. The problem that I have is that with these bail outs we are not punishing uncontrolled greed and thus there is little incentive to modify the behavior. The decision makers continue on having made millions over the years and their punishment (in some cases) is to be financial advisors to future Presidents, or to help write legislation to stop what they exploited. The ones who suffer are the people who lose their jobs and all of us who end up shouldering a huge potential extra tax burden to guarantee the loans.

The real scary part for me is the simialrities that this has with the Japanese banking crisis in the late 80s early 90s that lasterd over 10 years of horrible stagnation in their economy.

(Reply to this) (Thread)


[info]jwirenius
2008-09-27 04:30 am UTC (link)
Interesting. Thanks for commenting.

(Reply to this) (Parent)


[info]zigamorph
2008-09-27 03:56 am UTC (link)
I'm dashing off something of a rushed reply here, but I do want to make the point that market forces would correct this situation if they were allowed to play out. The problem is that such market forces are ruthlessly consistent in their application, and the result may be lots of people selling apples on the street. The issue is therefore whether it is actually desirable to resolve the present crisis through market forces alone.

Second, I think blaming anti-discrimination law for the mortgage crisis is absurd. Lenders went into the subprime sector because the rewards were higher, and — as any economist will tell you — reward follows risk. Recognizing the existence but not the underlying causes of increased risk, lenders securitized their loans and sought backup insurance against default. In turn, the insurers who sold these guarantees, notably AIG, failed to account for the risk in setting their premiums and reserves, because they didn't understand the nature of the risk any better than did the lenders.

In short, complexity was introduced in order to obscure the real risks, creating all sorts of novel debt instruments based, ultimately, on the expectation that the mortgages would perform. As long as real estate prices continued to increase, everyone had an incentive to look the other way because nothing was going wrong. Keep in mind that there has, in my opinion, been undue focus on worst case scenarios: even with some estimates that as many as half of owner-occupied residential mortgages being "upside down" (that is, with a larger principal balance than the collateral value of the property), only about 3% are in non-performing status.

Yes, the worst case scenario is very bad. Yes, some fiduciaries are duty-bound to assume the worst case. However, when the dust clears, this whole mess is going to cost a lot less than $700 billion to clean up.

(Reply to this) (Thread)


[info]jwirenius
2008-09-27 04:29 am UTC (link)
My reply is also dashed off, but--

1. I largely agree with your first point, assuming unlimited time for market forces to work, and if certain legal structures protecting the actual decisionmakers had not been previously put into place. Still, your point is overall valid, as is your qualifier.

2. Agreed. And, just to reiterate a point I think we agree on, the subprime lenders were not, overall, those governed by the CRA.

3. Interesting injection of realism, and perspective. Let's hope you're right.

(Reply to this) (Parent)

So, Has MediaMatters Responded to This Yet?
[info]alanesq
2008-09-29 08:31 pm UTC (link)

(Reply to this) (Thread)

Re: So, Has MediaMatters Responded to This Yet?
[info]jwirenius
2008-09-29 09:12 pm UTC (link)
Yes, and this answers my point exactly--how?

(Reply to this) (Parent)


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